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Statistical Inference in Political Networks Research
∗
Bruce A. Desmarais†and Skyler J. Cranmer‡
Abstract
Researchers interested in statistically modeling network data have a well-established and
quickly growing set of approaches from which to choose. Several of these methods have been
regularly applied in research on political networks, while others have yet to permeate the field.
Here, we review the most prominent methods of inferential network analysis – both for cross-
sectionally and longitudinally observed networks including (temporal) exponential random
graph models, latent space models, the quadratic assignment procedure, and stochastic actor
oriented models. For each method, we summarize its analytic form, identify prominent
published applications in political science and discuss computational considerations. We
conclude with a set of guidelines for selecting a method for a given application.
Appearing in The Oxford Handbook of Political Networks. Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Alexander H.
Montgomery, and Mark Lubell, editors. Oxford University Press, 2017.
1 Introduction
Networks are systems that exhibit complex interwoven structures. These systems can be illumi-
nating to describe and visualize, but most research agendas eventually arrive at either precise
hypotheses regarding endogenous network structures (e.g. the structure of connections within
the outcome network of interest) or similarly precise hypotheses regarding exogenous factors
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Leifeld for helpful comments. Work on this chapter was supported by National Science Foundation awards
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but requiring adjustment for endogenous dependencies. The conventional toolkit for statistical
inference is poorly suited to evaluating such hypotheses. The core problem is that the classical
machinery of hypothesis testing was designed around the assumption that the dataset to be used
is populated with independent replicates from a data generating process. Network data could
not be further from this assumption. The observations, which are often organized as dyads, are
individual components of a single broader system. Even if a researcher has several replicates
of the system, they are often dependent (e.g., longitudinal network data). Because the inter-
dependencies inherent in networks violate a core assumption upon which standard regression
models are built, interest in networks has sparked a wave of methodological innovations aimed
at statistical inference, modeling, and hypothesis testing with networks. Here, we review the
most established of these methods, briefly discuss their structure and capabilities, and highlight
selected applications of these tools in political science research. Obviously, a review chapter
such as this cannot discuss the intricacies of each model exhaustively, but we hope to provide
a general orientation to the set of techniques available and point the reader to where further
details and examples may be had.
2 Cross-Sectional Models
The basic approaches to statistical inference with networks are differentiated by the objectives
of the researcher vis-a-vis the network structure and dependencies. The approaches that we
review below permit researchers to test precise theories of network formation that involve both
the effects of covariates on tie formation and relationships among ties themselves. We also
present methods that permit inference when the researcher is uncertain regarding the forms of
dependence that underlie tie formation in the network. Here, we provide a very brief overview of
the three major methods of cross sectional network analysis and provide some discussion about
their use in the political science literature. For a more detailed discussion of how these methods
relate to each other, and for an illustrative application of all three to the same dataset, see
Cranmer et al. (2016).
2.1 The Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM)
We consider the Exponential Random Graph model (ERGM) (Holland and Leinhardt, 1981;
Wasserman and Pattison, 1996), to be the canonical model for network data. The ERGM pro-
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vides a modeling framework that can, just like conventional regression, accommodate the effects
of covariates on the status of relationships, but unlike regression, can model the prominence
and significance of structural dependencies such as reciprocity and transitivity. Furthermore,
the ERGM has been extended to accommodate longitudinal relational data (i.e., time series of
networks) (Robins and Pattison, 2001; Hanneke, Fu and Xing, 2010a; Desmarais and Cranmer,
2012b) and networks with edge weights (Wyatt, Choudhury and Bilmes, 2010; Desmarais and Cranmer,
2011; Krivitsky, 2011).
The mathematical form of the ERGM makes clear its potential as a general framework for
statistical inference with networks. The ERGM is a probability model defined on the support
of possible adjacency matrices. Let there be n actors/nodes/vertices, among which which we
represent dichotomous ties as Y , an n× n matrix with Yij = 1 if there is a tie from i to j and 0
otherwise. The probability of observing Y according to an ERGM is
P (Y ) =
exp(
∑k
j=1 θjhj(Y ))∑
Y ∗∈Y exp(
∑k
j=1 θjhj(Y
∗))
. (1)
The flexibility of the ERGM for capturing covariate effects and interdependencies in networks
arises from the general nature of the hj . These are statistics – functions applied to the adjacency
matrix and optionally covariates – that are theorized to influence the likelihood of observing a
configuration of the adjacency matrix (e.g., a network with 30 triangles, 100 edges and 25
reciprocal dyads). The θ are parameters to be estimated that, similar to regression coefficients,
give the effects of the network statistics on the likelihood of observing a particular instance of the
adjacency matrix. The larger θj, the higher the likelihood of observing subgraph configurations
that contribute positively to hj . The flexibility and grounding in theory come at a cost. An
identifying assumption, one also common to the regression framework, is that the model is
correctly specified. That is, it is assumed that every feature of a network configuration that is
relevant to determining whether we will observe that network configuration is represented by an
element of h. Misspecification can result in biased estimates of parameters as well as sub par
performance of hypothesis tests. A detailed review of the ERGM is provided by a number of
sources including Goodreau et al. (2008), Hunter et al. (2008), Cranmer and Desmarais (2011),
and Lusher, Koskinen and Robins (2013).
For applications of ERGM in political networks research see Thurner and Binder (2009),
Lazer et al. (2010), Cranmer and Desmarais (2011), Gerber, Henry and Lubell (2013), Kirkland and Gross
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(2014), Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson (2014), Song (2015).
Let us consider the example of Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson (2014) in detail. Recently,
scholars have begun to construct networks of interest groups based on cosigning the same amicus
curiae brief. Amicus curiae or “friend of the court” legal briefs are written by actors who are
not party to a case but believe they can offer information relevant to it. One contribution of
this work is that the network measure constructed from amicus curiae briefs is both coordinated
and purposive. The process requires negotiation between cosignatories and agreement on the
direction, argument and details of the brief. They find evidence of an increasingly transitive
network resembling a host of tightly grouped factions and leadership hub organizations em-
ploying mixed coalition strategies. Egocentric networks of organizations show that three major
theoretically posited coalition strategies are present in the data: “lone wolves,” who work alone;
“teammates,” who work with cliques of varying sizes; and “leaders,” who pull together otherwise
disparate groups. They further utilized business directories to gather attribute data on signers
from the first decade of the millennium. In doing so, they find a broad range of industries, with
the greatest number of signers in the Services Division of the Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (SIC). They also use the attribute data to test homophily hypotheses for various business
characteristics in the ERGM. The paper finds that driving the network formation is assortative
mixing based on industry area, budget, sales and membership characteristics.
Substantively, the paper contributes to the discipline by shedding light on how to measure
the networks of the vast expanse of special interests, how the networks have changed over time,
and which characteristics are sought out as complements and which are considered threatening
to cooperation. In addition it provides insights into more micro-level considerations about which
groups are the most attractive partners and in what capacity.
2.2 The Latent Space Model (LSM)
The latent space model, introduced by Hoff, Raftery and Handcock (2002) is latent variable
model for tie formation in networks that exploits the near ubiquity of homophily in networks
– the tendency for nodes to tie to others that are similar on one or more attribute. Nodes are
positioned in a k-dimensional latent space and the probability of a tie between any two nodes
is inversely related to the distance between their positions in this latent space. Each dimension
in the latent space can be thought of as an unmeasured attribute of nodes. For example,
such attributes might be income or age if nodes are people; or level of authoritarianism and
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unemployment rate if nodes are countries. Under the latent space model, the log odds of a tie
between nodes i and j is:
ηi,j = log odds(yi,j = 1|zi, zj , xi,j , α, β) (2)
= α+ β′xi,j − |zi − zj| (3)
where α is an intercept term controlling the overall density of the network, β is a vector of
regression coefficients, xi,j is vector of measured covariates, and |zi−zj| is the euclidean distance
between nodes in the latent space. Interpretation of the LSM is similar to interpreting logistic
regression. The β is interpreted as the change in the log odds of a tie given a one unit increase
in the value of a covariate.
For applications of LSM in political networks research see Ward, Siverson and Cao (2007),
Kirkland (2012), Krafft et al. (2012), Ward, Ahlquist and Rozenas (2013), Kirkland and Gross
(2014), Cao and Ward (2014).
To consider an example of such work in detail, let us examine Kirkland (2012). Kirkland
was primarily interested in the effect of an exogenous variable, the sharing of a constituency,
on what on the network of cosponsorships in the US Congress. In terms of design, he used
a natural experiment: during the 2000-2002 redistricting cycle, NC eliminated its small set
of multi-member districts as a result of a court intervention, allowing him to compare the
behavior of legislators in multi-member districts to those in single-member districts (since not
all NC districts were multi-member), and to compare legislators from multi-member districts
to themselves after the switch. His theory, being about exogenous predictors, did not provide
specific hypotheses about the structure of the endogenous network dependencies, the making
the proper specification of an ERGM difficult. Treating the network dependencies as a nuisance,
rather than an object of interest, he estimated a latent space model on each year in the sample.
This setup allowed Kirkland to test the effects of the exogenous variable of interest on the
network that while controlling for the interdependence known to be present. To select the
dimensionality of the LSM, Kirkland increased the number of dimensions in the model until the
new dimensions stopped producing significant gains in model fit; two dimensions as it should
happen.
Substantively, Kirkland (2012) demonstrates that sharing a constituency produces sizable
increases in collaboration via cosponsorship. There is some research both in American politics
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and in the comparative literature that suggests that multi-member districts produce representa-
tives who are likely to compete with one another to build a distinct “brand” from their district
partner, and that these districts produce representatives who lack strong geographic ties to their
constituents allowing them to adhere to party lines more frequently. Alternatively, Kirkland hy-
pothesized that the advantages of working together to gain on policy outweighed the potential
gains from adhering to party lines and building distinct individual brands and found that multi-
member districts provide legislators with natural coalition partners, who stand to gain on policy
through collaboration.
2.3 The Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP)
The quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) (Krackardt, 1987) is a method of hypothesis testing
that builds upon Mantel’s (1967) permutation procedure and computes the statistical signifi-
cance of parameter estimates when the dependent variable is itself a relational matrix (e.g.,
distance, correlation, network adjacency matrices). The QAP is a form of non-parametric per-
mutation testing in which row and column shuffles of the dependent and independent variables
are used to simulate the null condition, which results in a simulated null distribution of regression
coefficients.
To illustrate the basic methodology of QAP, we offer an example of bivariate permutation
in Figure 1. Randomly shuffling rows and columns of the adjacency matrix (Y) maintains the
structure of the network right down to the edges, but by shuffling the nodes, the relationship
between Y and a hypothetical dyadic covariate X, is broken. In the QAP, some measure of
relationship (e.g., correlation coefficient, regression) between Y and X is calculated on the un-
permuted data, then the same measure is calculated on many permutation based replications of
the data. A two-tailed p-value to assess the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between
Y and X can be calculated as the proportion of relationships calculated under permutations that
are at least as large, in magnitude, as the value calculated on the observed data.
Using QAP with three or more values is more complicated than using either Y or X permu-
tation, which are equivalent in the bivariate case. Suppose there are three relational variables
– the dependent network Y, the independent variable of interest X, and a potential confounder
Z, for which we would like to control in a regression calculating the effect of X on Y. Figure 2
depicts the causal diagram of Z inducing a spurious correlation between X and Y. Consider Y
permutation, in which the rows of Y are permuted to reflect the null hypothesis of no relation-
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YA B C
A 0 1 1
B 1 0 0
C 0 1 0
...
B C A
B 0 0 1
C 1 0 0
A 1 1 0
X
A B C
A 0 3 -2
B 1.2 0 -4
C 0 6 0
...
A B C
A 0 3 -2
B 1.2 0 -4
C 0 6 0
Figure 1: Illustration of bivariate QAP. Example of dependent network (i.e., Y) permutation.
Z
YX
Figure 2: Causal diagram illustrating the role of a confounder (Z) in creating a spurious corre-
lation between X and Y.
ship between Y and X. Doing this also breaks the relationship between Z and Y, which amounts
to assuming away one leg in the confounder diagram. Now consider X permutation, in which
just X is shuffled. This would break the relationship between Z and X, also assuming away a
leg in the confounding diagram.
Dekker, Krackhardt and Snijders (2007) propose an algorithm, termed double semi-partialing,
that is intended to balance between X and Y permutation, and they show performs better than
X or Y permutation. Let δˆZ be the estimate from Y = δZ + E. Define ǫˆXZ = X − δˆZ. Define
π(ǫˆXZ) to be a matrix permutation of ǫˆXZ . The non-parametric null distribution of β is derived
by estimating Y = π(ǫˆXZ)β + δZ + E. QAP is a very useful methodology when the researcher
is uncertain regarding what dependencies to include in ERGM or the latent space model does
not provide a good fit.
For applications of QAP in political networks research see Mizruchi (1990), Weible and Sabatier
(2005), Bochsler (2009), Shrestha and Feiock (2009), Henry (2011), Lee, Feiock and Lee (2012),
Heaney et al. (2012), Desmarais et al. (2015), Andrew et al. (2015), Chen, Suo and Ma (2015).
Considering the work of Henry (2011) as an example, the authors were interested in under-
standing the conditions under which party activists are members of the same associations and
particularly in assessing the extent to which co-partisanship affected this likelihood. Drawing
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upon surveys they conducted at the 2008 Democratic and Republican National Conventions,
Henry (2011) estimated models predicting organizational co-membership as a function of co-
partisanship. They also controlled for ideology, sex/gender, race/ethnicity, age, educational
attainment, income, and religious participation. The empirical analysis is particularly interest-
ing given our discussion above, but cause the authors specified three types of models: logistic
regression, the EQP, and an ERGM. Results from all three models showed that being in the
same party is a strong positive predictor of being in the same organization, even after controlling
for alternative explanations for co-membership. In fact, only 1.78% of co-memberships crossed
party lines: the association network is strongly polarized by party. The results illustrate one of
the many barriers to partisan polarization: party activists rarely come into contact with activists
from the other party in their civic and political associations.
3 Dynamic Models
The statistical analysis of longitudinal networks is a smaller literature than that for cross-
sectional networks. Two models that build on the ERGM, however, have been applied with some
frequency in political science. Here, we discuss each model and their applications to political sci-
ence briefly. For a direct contrast and comparison of the two models, see Desmarais and Cranmer
(2012a) and Leifeld and Cranmer (2014)
3.1 The Temporal ERGM (TERGM)
The temporal exponential random graph model (TERGM) is a straightforward longitudinal
extension of the ERGM. The defining feature of the TERGM vis-a-vis the ERGM is that the
statistics in the TERGM model the ways in which past realizations of the network influence the
current network.
To modify the ERGM for modeling how the network N at time t, denoted N t, depends on
previous networks K ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, we simply introduce the lagged networks into the h.
P (Y t|Y t−K , . . . , Y t−1, θ) =
exp(θ⊤h(Y t, Y t−1, . . . , Y t−K))
c(θ, Y t−K , . . . , Y t−1)
. (4)
The specification of K is important because Y t networks in the time series preceding time point
K + 1 cannot be modeled with the correct model.
Equation 4 specifies a TERGM for a single time point, Y t. The joint likelihood of the time
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series of networks spanning times K + 1 and T is derived as the product of the conditional
probabilities – conditioning on past networks:
P (Y K+1, . . . , Y T |Y 1, . . . , Y K , θ) =
T∏
t=K+1
P (Y t|Y t−K , . . . , Y t−1, θ). (5)
A TERGM can be applied to just a single network, which is equivalent to using ERGM with
statistics involving one or more lagged networks, or a time series of networks with dozens or
even hundreds of networks. For more detailed methodological treatment of the TERGM, see
Hanneke, Fu and Xing (2010b), Cranmer and Desmarais (2011), and Desmarais and Cranmer
(2012c). The bootstrap pseudo likelihood methods introduced in Desmarais and Cranmer (2012c)
permit computationally efficient application to long time series.
Dependence on lagged networks can be incorporated in a fashion similar to including a
covariate in a cross-sectional ERGM. For example, reciprocation is a nearly ubiquitous process
in social networks. However, in time-stamped data, it is not clear whether the reciprocation of a
tie will occur within one time period – especially if ties take a long time to form (e.g., links in an
annually measured scientific paper citation network) or if time periods are notably short (e.g.,
an e-mail network with hourly time stamps). To observe reciprocity, we may need to measure
it with a lag. Single-period delayed reciprocity is modeled as:
hr(Y
t, Y t−1) =
∑
ji
Y tijY
t−1
ji . (6)
The lagged effects in a TERGM specification – the components of h – can vary in terms of
their order, from 1 to K. For example, if K = 4 we could model star-formation processes
that aggregate over four periods, but also limit reciprocity effects to a single period. See
Morris, Handcock and Hunter (2008) for an extensive review of endogenous effect specification.
For applications of the TERGM in political networks research, in which myriad exam-
ples of lagged endogenous effects can be found, see, e.g., Cranmer, Desmarais and Menninga
(2012), Cranmer, Desmarais and Kirkland (2012), Almquist and Butts (2013), Clark and Caro
(2013), Corbetta (2013), Cranmer, Heinrich and Desmarais (2014), Masket and Shor (2014),
and Ingold and Leifeld (Forthcoming).
Consider the work of Ingold and Leifeld (Forthcoming) as an example. Dozens of policy
network case studies in continental Europe have used almost identical survey questionnaires
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to collect data over the last three decades. In addition to data on collaboration, information
exchange, and a variety of actor attributes, respondents were usually asked whom they would
judge as particularly important in the rest of the network. While this is obviously a network
relation, earlier studies aggregated it into a node attribute in order to measure an actor’s overall
importance in the policy network. Ingold and Leifeld (Forthcoming)exploited the fact that this is
a network relation and modeled it using ERGMs for the cross-sectional datasets and TERGMs for
the longitudinal data set. Specifically, they used four different datasets from different countries
(institutional settings), levels (local to national), and policy stages (implementation and policy
formulation decision making) to assure validity of results across contexts (and indeed they mostly
are). In terms of specification, they estimated an ERGM of their second temporal observation
conditional on the first, thus modeling the changes between periods one and two. The TERGM
examined whether changes in the betweenness centrality of actors in the collaboration network
could explain their perception as being important at the second time point. In other words, it
is not simply collaboration centrality that makes one important; it is not simply collaboration
ties with alters that make one regard that other organization as important; and it’s not simply
one’s institutional role that makes one important (e.g., being a decision maker)—it’s also that
becoming more central over time makes alters perceive an ego as being an important player
in the policy process. As the predictor of interest was betweenness centrality, this reflects the
ability to tie different communities in the network together.
3.2 Stochastic Actor Oriented Models (SAOMs)
The stochastic actor oriented model (SAOM) (Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich, 2010) is a
statistical model for longitudinal network data that has seen considerable application in political
networks research and can be considered an alternative to TERGM. The SAOM is a structurally
detailed model that is focused on interpretation at the node level. The SAOM and TERGM
are similar in many underlying facets. Indeed, the equilibrium distribution of the SAOM is an
exponential family random graph (Snijders, 2001). The “actor orientation” in the SAOM begins
with an assumption about how the network changes. First, ties change one at a time. An actor
is selected at random according to a Poisson process. The actor can then choose to leave its
tie profile unchanged or change a single outgoing tie. The rates that parameterize the Poisson
processes can be actor-specific, modeling how tie volatility varies based on actor-level covariates.
Let Y (ij) represent the network in which element ij of the adjacency matrix is toggled (changed
10
from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0). If selected to consider a tie change, the probability that actor i
changes its tie status with j is proportional to exp(
∑k
h=1 θhΓih(Y
(ij))), where
∑k
h=1 θhΓih(Y
(ij))
is the actor “objective function” (Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich, 2010). Like the ERGM,
the building blocks are regression coefficient style parameters θ and network statistics Γ(). The
SAOM objective function is a dot product of network statistics that change with the ties sent
by actor i and real-valued parameters.
An added feature of the SAOM relative to TERGM is that it offers the option of speci-
fying a dynamic model for time-dependent actor attributes termed “behavior.” The behavior
equation includes both other node covariates and functions of the network designed to evaluate
how the network influences behavior. To develop the idea of the behavior model, first consider
a regression for a node attribute at time t, which includes as covariates other node attributes
as well as node-level statistics calculated on the network at time t − 1 (e.g., node centrality,
the average attribute value of a node’s partners in the network). Instead of directly measur-
ing the network at t − 1 in order to model node attributes at time t, intermediate changes
in both the network and behavior are simulated between times t and t − 1. The model for
the change in behavior between times t − 1 and t includes an iterative process of change be-
tween the network and behavior – changes that are simulated/inferred, as they are not observed
(Steglich, Snijders and Pearson, 2010). This simulation of intermediate changes is the modeling
feature that differentiates TERGM and SAOM. The canonical form of data for which the SAOM
is designed is network snapshot data, in which the ties in a network are sampled at different
points in time, and the researcher does not know how the network changed between snapshots.
The changes are simulated according to the detailed structural assumptions in the SAOM. Fi-
nally, one should also note the widespread misconception that this coevolutionary model can
identify separate influences for homophily and influence, two forces that are usually confounded
in network research. As Snijders, van de Bunt and Steglich (2010) point out, the SAOM can
only make this differentiation in extremely limited cases and the model is not generally capable
of this differentiation in applied research contexts.
Political science applications of SAOM include Berardo and Scholz (2010), Fischer et al.
(2012), Fischer and Sciarini (2013), Berardo (2013), Kinne (2014), Manger and Pickup (2014).
As a last example from the literature, consider Berardo (2013). Berardo (2013) studies
perceptions of procedural fairness in self-organized networks of stakeholders in five U.S. estuaries
where environmental problems are common. How members of a group perceive fairness in the
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decision-making processes is a key variable to study for researchers interested in the study of
collaborative processes, given that those processes where procedural fairness is low usually are
less likely to be sustained in time. Berardo finds that participation in networks does not alter
perceptions of procedural fairness. Instead, it is perceptions of procedural fairness what impacts
participation in networks, with homophily seeming to drive the process. In other words, similar
perceptions of fairness is a strong predictor of the establishment of ties among actors. Berardo
claims that this is an important result because it hints to the fact that, in the absence of high
levels of procedural fairness, the network is likely to be fragmented into groups of “winners” and
“losers” of the decision-making process, which may make long-term collaboration at a systemic
level hard to sustain.
4 Selecting an appropriate approach
The methods described above differ along a couple of important dimensions. These dimensions
include (1) the role of structural network theory in developing a model specification, and (2) the
degree to which interdependence is accounted for through the model parameters vs through the
hypothesis testing framework. Considering how a given application aligns along these dimen-
sions, the researcher can determine which of these methods is most appropriate.
The first major consideration in selecting a model for a network regards whether one of the
objectives of the research is to conduct inference regarding precise patterns of interdependence
among the ties in the network. For example, Song (2015) state several hypotheses regarding
interdependence between ties in networks of political discussion. These include popularity (the
tendency to send ties to nodes with high in-degree, activity (the tendency for nodes with high
out degree to send new ties at a higher rate) and transitivity. When the researcher has precise
hypotheses regarding dependence among the ties, the only models that we have discussed that
can be used are those based on the ERGM – ERGM, TERGM, and SAOM – the latter two in the
case of longitudinal networks. The LSM, though useful for the purpose of exploring the structure
of the network that is not explained through the use of exogenous node and dyad covariates,
cannot be used to test hypotheses regarding the interdependence among ties. QAP represents a
method of hypothesis testing that is robust to the presence of interdependence among the ties in
the network, but there is no way to use QAP results in diagnosing the forms of interdependence
that exist among the ties.
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If the researcher is only interested in testing the effects of covariates, but would like to account
for network dependence, the second important consideration is the choice between parametric
and non-parametric methods. Both the ERGM and LSM use precise parameterizations to model
away the interdependence for which the covariates do not account. In the ERGM, the researcher
must specify the exact network statistics that correspond to the forms of interdependence, a
process which may sometimes be burdensome. In the LSM, the interdependence is absorbed by
a large latent parameter space of unmeasured node attributes, along which nodes are assumed
to be homophilous.
With both the LSM and ERGM, it is possible that the researcher will fail to specify a model
that results in the good fit required to draw inferences with a parametric model. As noted
above, specification of an ERGM requires precise theory regarding the forms of interdependence
in a network. The LSM demands less in terms of precise assumptions regarding structural
dependencies, but it does impose some limitations. The dependence structures in the LSM must
conform closely to a metric space in which the probability of a tie is inversely proportional to
distance in the space. This creates two limitations on the LSM in accounting for dependence.
These limitations derive from the properties of metric spaces (Bryant, 1985). The first property
is symmetry, which means that the distance from i to j is equivalent to the distance from j to i. If
the probability of a tie is linked to these symmetric distances in the latent space, then the latent
space model implies that ties exhibit a tendency towards reciprocity. Symmetric dependence
would be inappropriate for a hierarchical network, for example, in which ties flow along paths
that do not loop back (e.g., an organizational chart) (Krackhardt, Carley and Prietula, 1994).
The other relevant property of a metric space is the triangle inequality, which indicates that
the distance between i and j can be at most the distance between i and k and j and k, where
k is any other node in the network. This means that if, according to the latent space, i is
very likely to tie with k and j is very likely to tie with k, then i and j will also be likely to
tie. The triangle inequality embeds transitivity into the structural assumptions underlying the
LSM. Such an assumption would be inappropriate for a conflictual network, in which the enemy
of your enemy is likely your friend (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011). If the researcher’s theory of
network dependence is not precise enough to specify an ERGM and the structural assumptions
associated with the LSM are not suitable in a given application, then QAP is the best option.
Model dependence is the term used to describe the conditions under which the conclusions
drawn from a statistical modeling exercise vary across reasonable alternative specifications of
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the model (Ho et al., 2007). For example, if a test of the hypothesis that nodes in a network
exhibited homophily with respect to a given attribute exhibited different results when using
LSM and QAP, the test would be model dependent. If the researcher’s primary interest lies in
testing hypotheses regarding the effects of exogenous covariates, and the researcher has identified
plausible specifications of ERGM and/or LSM, is prudent to also evaluate hypotheses using QAP.
If results are consistent across ERGM, LSM, and QAP, that is a strong sign of robustness. If
they vary, the researcher should endeavor to understand why and assure that the structural
assumptions represented by ERGM and/or LSM are indeed appropriate.
Turning to dynamic models, the literature on political networks presents two modeling op-
tions – SAOM and TERGM. 1 Both Desmarais and Cranmer (2012a) and Leifeld and Cranmer
(2014) present thorough discussions of the ways in which researchers can draw conceptual and
empirical comparisons of SAOM and TERGM. First, in terms of empirical comparison, if the
researcher does not have theoretical reason to prefer either SAOM or TERGM, it is possible
to use either in or out-of-sample comparisons to evaluate which method provides a better fit.
Desmarais and Cranmer (2012a) and Leifeld and Cranmer (2014) provide extensive discussion
and examples regarding the empirical comparison of SAOM and TERGM.
There are a few considerations that may allow the researcher to select between SAOM and
TERGM based on theory. First, is it appropriate to assume that the network changes according
to a process in which an actor considers changing one out-going tie at a time to stochastically
optimize their objective function? If the answer to this question is yes, then the SAOM is
a favorable option. Through making this assumption about the form of network change, it
is possible to identify other features of the network dynamics, such as differentiating between
homophily and influence. If the answer to this question is no, then TERGM is favorable because
there are no such assumptions regarding the form of network change. Second, do the ties in the
network and behavior co-evolve simultaneously? As we note above, the SAOM consists of two
equations – an objective function for tie formation and another for behavior (i.e., node attribute)
evolution. The main advantage of using SAOM over estimating these functions separately is
that, through the structural assumptions regarding change dynamics, it is possible to identify
co-evolution dynamics that occur at a finer time interval than that at which the data was
collected. Third, is there a reason to suspect non-stationarity in the time series of networks?
1Ward, Ahlquist and Rozenas (2013) propose a dynamic extension of the LSM. However, within-dyad auto-
correlation is the only form of network dependence for which it accounts. Since it does not account for higher
order forms of interdependence, we do not consider it to be a dynamic network model along the same lines as
SAOM and TERGM, which both permit the modeling of arbitrary forms of inter-temporal dependence.
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Underlying the TERGM is an assumption that the series of networks under analysis has reached
a stationary distribution – a stable time-point-to-time-point process of network generation. In
the SAOM it is assumed that change over time follows a stable/stationary process, but it is not
assumed that the time series of networks has reached stationarity. Thus, if the network under
study has recently come into formation – suggesting that more time may need to pass to reach
stationarity, or there is some inexplicable shift in the network’s structure over time, use of the
SAOM would be favored.
5 Frontiers in Network Modeling
Scholars of government and politics are in a nearly unique position as far as access to data on
ties between the actors they study. In every subfield of political science – from political behav-
ior research on campaign contribution networks of individuals to intra-institutional studies of
interaction within legislatures or administrative agencies, to international studies of trade flows,
alliances and migration – data is regularly available and often open by public records mandate.
Furthermore, this rich archival data often represents a census of the relevant population that
covers several decades or even centuries. Since such varied and rich data is available, it is safe
to assume that most established methods for modeling network data could be fruitfully applied
to problems in political networks research. Furthermore, as the field of automated text analysis
matures the volume and scope of network data available to political scientists is likely to ex-
plode. On the frontier of research we see great promise in the application of network methods
to diverse dataset and in the generation of new political networks data.
The frontier of statistical network analysis is also developing quickly. One area where the
field is rapidly evolving is in techniques for analyzing weighted (e.g. valued-edge) networks:
(Wyatt, Choudhury and Bilmes, 2010; Desmarais and Cranmer, 2011; Krivitsky, 2011) have
proposed methods for approaching this problem and software is now available to implement these
techniques. Other recent developments that show promise and deserve further consideration in
political networks research include the mixed membership stochastic blockmodel (Airoldi et al.,
2009), exponential family random network models (Fellows and Handcock, 2012), and relational
event models for longitudinal data (Butts, 2008), but these methods have, as of this writing, yet
to permeate political science.
In sum, political network analysis is developing rapidly in terms of the range of substantive
15
problems to which network analysis is applied, the quality and volume of network data avail-
able to political scientists, and the statistical methods themselves. We think it likely that the
landscape of political networks will look substantially different ten years after this writing than
it does today.
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